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The Oslo
War
Process Historical and Investigative Research, 29
Oct 2005
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6 4. Vollebaek’s Rambouillet diplomacy
( this section co-authored
with Jared Israel ) On 2 February 1999, what NATO called ‘peace talks’ began in the town of Rambouillet, France. The following is from The Washington Post:
Notice the language that the Washington Post employs. Belgrade is "the principal stumbling block" because of "its opposition to the peacekeeping force." The use of the phrase "peacekeeping force" makes the Belgrade government sound pathologically mule-headed. Who in his right mind wouldn't want to keep the peace? And therefore, if NATO felt like it had no further choice but to declare war, Belgrade's "intransigence" would be to blame. How different the public's impressions of all this would have been if the Washington Post and the rest of the Western media had merely done three things:
If the press had done this, people would have realized that the masterminds of the Racak hoax were the same people now demanding that president Slobodan Milosevic sign on the dotted line at Rambouillet -- or else. And they would have seen also that the so-called Rambouillet "Agreement" was in fact a declaration of war. But the press didn't explain anything to the public. In fact, the contents of the Rambouillet agreement were not even paraphrased by the Western press. This is shocking. How can the public be expected to understand the behavior of the Yugoslavs without knowing what they were rejecting? The terms of Rambouillet effectively separated the province of Kosovo from the Republic of Serbia, of which it was part, leaving the KLA terrorists as the provincial authority. This alone was reason enough for any country not to sign. What country would want to sign, under duress, a document prepared by a foreign power, and meant to section off a piece of the country -- and especially the very piece which is the cradle of one's culture? Should any country, on top of that, want to leave the forcibly seceded population at the mercy of terrorists? But if that were not enough to help you understand the Yugoslav refusal to sign Rambouillet, there is also Appendix B of the 'Agreement,' which stipulates the details of the NATO "peacekeeping force." Here are some excerpts (our emphases below):
Simply amazing. This 'Agreement' would have made NATO lord and master of Yugoslavia. NATO was demanding terms comparable to those imposed by the invading Nazis in WWII. How could anyone but a quisling government sign such a document? Since NATO was saying to Milosevic, "Sign or we will bomb you," and since the document was designed so that it was impossible to sign, NATO was declaring war. This is easy to see if anybody reads the agreement, but the media did not let the public read it. Knut Vollebaek, naturally, was perfectly familiarized with the contents of Appendix B, and he was at the center of the Rambouillet maneuver. The Washington Post wrote on 19 February 1999:
The Washington Post garnishes its article with a dash of candor: "…concerted efforts to subdue Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic...," but this cannot overwhelm the rich Orwellian sauce. The Rambouillet Agreement was cooked up to be a declaration of war, but the Post and everybody else in the mainstream media served it up as a 'peace process.' Vollebaek was a central figure in the effort to subdue Milosevic into accepting NATO's occupation process, "jetting around the globe, fielding calls from [NATO's] Solana and comparing notes with French counterpart [Foreign Minister] Hubert Vedrine and German opposite number Joschka Fischer," and "he and Albright saw ‘eye-to-eye,’" as the Post explained. But perhaps the most amazing thing about Albright, Vollebaek, and Co. threatening the Yugoslavs with bombs unless they signed is that, at the time of the threats, the "other party" to the supposed agreement -- the Albanian secessionist delegation at Rambouillet -- was refusing to sign! Actually (look at the dates) the truth is that two full weeks after the Yugoslavs were threatened, the Albanians were still refusing to sign. This is what the Washington Post wrote on 2 March 1999:
The ethnic Albanian factions still aren't signing. The document is still a draft (!) and its American author expresses optimism -- optimism! --that the Albanians will perhaps sign... But two weeks earlier, when NATO was already threatening Milosevic with bombs lest he refuse to sign, the Washington Post had told its readers that, "The principal stumbling block to achieving an agreement at the 12-day-old Kosovo peace talks outside Paris remains the opposition of the Serb-led Belgrade government…" (see opening quote from the Washington Post, at the top). Mind boggling.
The Rambouillet 'Agreement' was never anything of the sort. Let us review the relevant points.
This last absurdity is the capping stone. At Rambouillet, the Yugoslav delegation, comprised of legitimate representatives of the various ethnic communities in Kosovo, was never allowed to meet face-to-face with the NATO-organized secessionist terrorists. Not once. Instead, NATO officials stage-managed their Rambouillet phony diplomacy, directly meeting with the various delegations and with the press even though they were not one of the parties involved in the "talks." Belgrade naturally refused to sign the 'Agreement' -- and this is precisely what NATO intended when it drafted it: to make it impossible for the Yugoslavs to sign. But it is significant that, until the last moment, neither did the secessionists sign it! (And since nobody wanted to sign, who exactly was 'agreeing'? Christopher Hill, the American author of the 'agreement'?) As Slobodan Milosevic told the British and French Foreign Ministers in a letter dated 22 March 1999:
Obviously, this 'Agreement' was no agreement at all. It was a document drafted by a far away Imperial Power (the author, Christopher Hill, worked for the US State Department) in a rather crude attempt to create the impression that diplomacy had failed so that the "intransigence" of the Yugoslavs would be seen as the cause of war. Nobody realized what happened because the media, rather than print the contents of the Rambouillet so-called 'agreement', obligingly cooperated with NATO disinformation instead. For example, notice how Knut Vollebaek, the very picture of a gentle, neutral Norseman, took this package of lies and threats of war, and turned it upside down (with no comment from the Washington Post):
Notice what Vollebaek says, and how he talks. First, he says that the OSCE observers were "unarmed." Yes, so long as you don't count the armed forces of the US, Britain, Germany, Holland, Norway, etc., etc, which stood behind them. Second, he talks about the supposed "harassment" of OSCE observers. Huh? These OSCE observers were in fact US Intelligence operatives forced on Yugoslavia in October 1998 under threat of bombing (see part 2). These US Intelligence operatives organized and trained the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to be NATO's field army prior to the onset of NATO bombing (see part 3). And they coordinated the KLA effort to take a dominating position among the heads of Kosovo Albanian clans. This was crucial, for the KLA needed to organize the mass exodus of Albanians at the outset of the bombing. How this propaganda coup was pulled off is explained in the Emperor's Clothes article: "Why Albanians fled Kosovo during NATO bombing."[26a] The OSCE observers scoped out the countryside, selecting targets for later bombing attacks, even using CARE workers to place electronic bombing markers.[26b] If anybody harassed these people, they richly deserved it! And why does Vollebaek refer to a beating by Yugoslav civilians as a government action? And why does Vollebaek say "International military presence in Yugoslavia," when he should really be saying 'NATO army of occupation'? Finally, notice that Vollebaek says: "Milosevic rather flatly refused." Refused what? To accept the complete NATO takeover of his country, a country he had sworn to protect, and of whose army he was Commander in Chief. Yes, I guess that's the sort of thing one flatly refuses. Till the end, Knut Vollebaek played the role of neutral diplomat from a tiny and supposedly harmless country, chairing the OSCE, an organization supposedly not under the direct command of the US and its allies. But the appearance of neutrality was an illusion. Here is Knut Vollebaek delivering the final ultimatum (from the Washington Post):
Vollebaek said he would have to call NATO commanders. Sometimes he tells the truth. Up next I examine how thoroughly Knut Vollebaek betrayed the very purpose of the body he lead, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Continue to
part 5:
Footnotes and Further
Reading [23] The Washington Post, February 19, 1999, Friday, Final Edition, A SECTION; Pg. A01, 1139 words, Allies Reiterate Threats to Serbs; Albright to Join Kosovo Peace Talks, William Drozdiak, Washington Post Foreign Service, BERLIN, Feb. 18
[23a]
"The Road to Jenin: The Racak 'massacre' hoax, and
those whose honesty it places in doubt: Helena Ranta, NATO, the UN, The
New York Times, The Washington Post, CNN, The Associated Press, and
Human Rights Watch"; Historical and Investigative Research; 16 April
2003; by Francisco Gil-White. [24] Full text of the Rambouillet Agreement: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html [25] The Washington Post, February 19, 1999, Friday, Final Edition, A SECTION; Pg. A18; DIPLOMATIC DISPATCHES, 896 words, Ready for Trouble in Yugoslavia, Nora Boustany [26] The Washington Post, March 02, 1999, Tuesday, Final Edition, A SECTION; Pg. A13, 745 words, Kosovo Groups Warm to Pact; Belgrade Remains Opposed to Peacekeepers, Envoy Says, R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post Foreign Service, BELGRADE, March 1 [26a]
This is discussed in an
interview with the former historian of Kosovo, Cedomir
Prlincevic, "Why Albanians Fled During the NATO
Bombing," at [26b]
Regarding the use of CARE
workers for spying, see "Humanitarian Spies,"
at [27] Krieger, H. (2001). The Kosovo conflict and international law: An analytical documentation 1974-1999, Cambridge International Documents Series, Volume II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.286 [28] The Washington Post, December 07, 2001, Friday, Final Edition, A SECTION; Pg. A44; DIPLOMATIC DISPATCHES NORA BOUSTANY, 959 words, Little Norway's Big Contributions, Nora Boustany |
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