This piece
defends and supports with evidence one hypothesis of what the
1991 Gulf War was really about: protecting Islamist
radicalism in Iran.
This piece is
included in the present series to explain Bush Jr.'s current war on Iraq
because HIR believes that in order to understand the present we
must know the past. So, in order to
understand current US policy towards Iraq, I will argue, one must
understand what past US policy towards both Iraq and Iran has
been. Consider: before the
1991 Gulf War there was the Iran-Iraq war, during which we had
the Iran-Contra affair, the scandal of which revealed US policies
to be strengthening Iran
against Iraq. After the 1991 Gulf War, US policy was to
contain Iraq, which also had
the effect of strengthening Iran against Iraq. This makes it
unsurprising that the 1991 Gulf War, too, had the effect of
strengthening Iran against Iraq. Quite consistent. The first hypothesis for any policy ought to be that its
actual effects are intended, particularly when
policies producing identical effects are launched over and over
again, with numbing consistency. This first hypothesis is the
one that I will defend.
___________________________________________________________
Table of Contents
( hyperlinked
< )
<
Introduction
<
The
hypothesis: the US has a pro-Islamist,
pro-terrorist policy.
<
The
suspicious prelude to the 1991 Gulf War:
Khomeini, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Iran-Contra affair.
<
The
mastermind: Zalmay Khalilzad.
<
Iraq
was an obstacle to the US's pro-Islamist policy;
hence, the Gulf War.
<
The
US ordered Kuwait to provoke Iraq.
<
The
hypothesis that the US attacked Iraq 'for oil' is absurd.
___________________________________________________________
Introduction
I believe the US
has a pro-Iranian policy, by which I mean not a policy to help
ordinary Iranians, but a policy to support the Islamist
terrorists who run the country. My view will be surprising if you have
noticed at all the tradition of public invective between US and
Iranian officials. This loud trading of insults goes back to
1979, when the Shiite Muslim fundamentalist Ayatollah Khomeini
assumed power in Iran, after which large crowds of
Khomeini-backed Iranian students, having seized the US embassy
in Tehran and taken hostage its personnel, began chanting, fist
over head, Khomeini’s new name for the United States: “Great
Satan.” US government officials reciprocated with
counter-denunciations of the Iranian mullahs, calling them
“extremists” and “terrorists.” I was young but I remember
watching some of this on my TV set, in real time. It was
impressive. One really got the feeling of a great enmity between
the US and Iranian governments, and this impression has been
reinforced over the years by the mutual and repeated
denunciations of US and Iranian officials. Just recently, Bush
Jr. has included Iran in his ‘Axis of Evil.’ The only thing that
can possibly top that is “Great Satan,” but Khomeini used it
already.
Should we infer
the structure of alliances from these mutual accusations?
No. The people
who run countries routinely misrepresent what they are doing.
And politics doesn’t just make strange bedfellows; it can also
make bedfellows who merely pretend to be estranged. In
consequence, a scientist cannot proceed directly and
uncritically from official statements to a model of geopolitical
alliances, lest he become a propagandist. Any claim about how
the various forces are aligned requires a demonstration whose
logic and documentation others can check, and which makes
reference to the behaviors -- not the official statements
-- of governments.
For this reason,
the current threats to attack Iran over
its nuclear program should be taken with a big grain of salt.
The hypothesis: the US has a pro-Islamist,
pro-terrorist policy
________________
Since the
supposed enmity between the US and Iranian governments dates to
1979, it is significant that in 1979, as is relatively well
known, the US created and then sponsored throughout the 1980s a
‘holy warrior’ movement in Afghanistan. The point of this was to
attack the Soviet Union which had a border with Afghanistan. The man who invented this strategy,
Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski,
has recently explained to Le Nouvel Observateur, proudly,
that the production of fanatical Muslim terrorists in
Afghanistan -- the mujahedin (or mujahideen), who went on to
become an international mercenary force -- was quite deliberate,
and meant to generate a conflict on the Soviet border (my emphasis, below):
[Quote from Le Nouvel Observateur begins here]
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Former CIA director Robert Gates states
in his memoirs: The American secret services began, six months
before the Soviet intervention, to support the Mujahideen [in
Afghanistan]. At that time you were president Carter’s security
advisor; thus you played a key role in this affair. Do you
confirm this statement?
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Yes. According to the official version, the
CIA's support for the Mujahideen began in 1980, i.e. after the
Soviet army's invasion of Afghanistan on 24 December 1979.
But the reality, which was kept secret until today, is
completely different: Actually it was on 3 July 1979 that
president Carter signed the first directive for the secret
support of the opposition against the pro-Soviet regime in
Kabul. And on the same day I wrote a note, in which I
explained to the president that this support would in my opinion
lead to a military intervention by the Soviets.[1]
[Quote ends here]
It appears that
the interviewer was a bit shocked, for he asked:
[Back
to Le Nouvel Observateur]
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: ...don't you regret having helped future
terrorists, having given them weapons and advice?
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: What is most important for world history?
The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? Some Islamic
hotheads or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the
cold war?
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: "Some hotheads?" But it has been said
time and time again: today Islamic fundamentalism represents a
world-wide threat...
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Rubbish![1]
[Quote ends here]
It has been said
that what Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Robert Gates were trying to do was give the Soviet
Union its Viet Nam: a withering conflict it could not win. The
comparison, however, has a few problems. The US wanted
the war on Viet Nam; the Soviets, by contrast, didn't ask for an
Islamist terrorist disaster on their border -- it came courtesy
of the United States. The masses of Vietnamese supported the
people whom the US fought; the Afghan movement, by contrast, was
manufactured from the outside, by the US. Finally, Viet Nam is
far away from the US whereas Afghanistan is smack against the
former Soviet Union. What is undeniable is that the US ruling
elite succeeded in producing a conflict on the Soviet border
that the Soviets could not win. Moreover, this Islamist terrorist
movement would grow and feed the growth of other such movements
in Central Asia and the Middle East.
Jimmy Carter and
Zbigniew Brzezinski also began at this time a secret buildup of
Saudi Arabia's military, which Reagan also continued, and which
made this country, according to Frontline (PBS),
“ultimately...the largest beneficiary of U.S. weapons sales in
the entire world” and “one of the most heavily armed countries
in the world.”
[2]
Frontline says lots of interesting things. For example, that
“years before Desert Storm [i.e. the 1991 Gulf War]
billion-dollar state-of-the-art military bases were already in
place [in Saudi Arabia], built to U.S. military specifications,
ready and waiting for the arrival of American soldiers.” Now,
Saudi Arabia is an Islamist theocracy, and in addition spends
millions of its oil dollars every year sponsoring Islamist
terrorism and antisemitic agitation all over the world. If the
US both allies with and arms this country to the teeth, then it
is allied with its antisemitic Islamist and terrorist policy.
When did this begin? Frontline says: “The story of the Saudi
military build-up begins...during the last days of the Shah of
Iran.” In other words, Jimmy Carter began the extreme military
buildup of Saudi Arabia right around the time that the Ayatollah
Khomeini came to power, because Khomeini is who replaced the shah.
So we’ve got that
the US began serious sponsorship of Islamist terrorism in
Afghanistan in 1979. It was also in 1979 that the US began seriously arming the
Saudi Arabian Islamist terrorists. And look: the Ayatollah
Khomeini, an Islamist terrorist, came to power in Iran in...1979.
A trifecta?
Yes, assuming
that the
Ayatollah Khomeini was a US asset. From the above context, this hypothesis
should at least be put on the table.
Jared Israel from
Emperor’s Clothes has argued
for some time -- and has carefully documented -- that the US
ruling elite actively promotes Islamist terrorism in Asia
because it destabilizes the big Asian countries -- Russia,
China, and India -- that compete with the US for geopolitical
influence. This strategy works, he says, because these countries have
Muslim populations on both sides of their borders.
[3]
According to Jared Israel, the promotion of Islamist terrorism
is no mere side effect of US foreign policy, but its main goal.
Is he right?
As we have seen
above, the US ruling elite has already confessed that Jared
Israel is right in the case of Afghanistan. To see whether he is
right in general, we can put his
hypothesis to the test. There is no better test than to
look at US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq, for Jared Israel’s hypothesis
here will either produce absurdities
at every turn, or else it will tend to explain everything. Why?
Because the contest between these two states was always
perceived to be decisive for the success or failure of
theocratic Islamism in the Middle East. As Milton Viorst puts it:
“At stake was whether the secular [but still ruthless] Baathism
of Saddam or the radical [Muslim fundamentalist] Shiism of
Khomeini would prevail in Iraq, and perhaps in the Middle East.”
[4]
With stakes like
these, Jared Israel’s hypothesis of a pro-Islamist US foreign
policy requires, for example, that the outcome of the
Iran-Iraq war was not good for the US ruling elite, because,
“in August 1988 Iran’s deteriorating economy and recent Iraqi
gains on the battlefield compelled Iran to accept a United
Nations-mediated cease-fire that it had previously resisted.”
[5]
As Jared Israel
himself has pointed out, his hypothesis here predicted that the
United States would do something dramatic to re-strengthen Iran
relative to Iraq, and look: just three years later, in 1991,
the US launched the Gulf War against Iraq.
[6]
What I will show in this piece is that Jared Israel’s hypothesis
can account for every little detail of the Gulf War of 1991,
including its prelude and aftermath.
The point of this
series of articles is to provide the historical background
necessary to a proper understanding of Bush Jr.’s current war on
Iraq. I have argued in the
General Introduction that the
point of Bush Jr.’s war is to chew up Iraq, making it soft for
Iran to swallow.[6a]
Certainly, the consequence of Bush Jr.'s attack plus
withdrawal will be that Iran will swallow up Iraq, as I also
argue in that piece. This will be portrayed by US officials as
an ‘unfortunate’ and ‘unintended’ consequence. But it would be
remarkable for the US to manage accidentally the result
it has clearly been working very hard to produce since 1979.
What I aim to show is that the result of the US invasion of Iraq
-- strengthening Iran -- will be consistent with a long string
of major US foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East.
Our present focus
is the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq which, as I will show, was
explicitly meant by US policy planners to weaken Iraq and
make Iran in consequence relatively stronger. This is indeed
what the war achieved. But since US foreign policy in the
prelude to the Gulf War was also perfectly consistent with
the view that the US favors the Iranian Islamists, I will begin
by taking a look at this prelude, the better to understand the Gulf War
itself.
The suspicious prelude to the 1991 Gulf War:
Khomeini, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Iran-Contra affair
______________________________________________
After taking
power in 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini immediately provoked a war
with Iraq. The Washington Post wrote that “...after [Khomeini]
returned to Iran in triumph in February 1979 he set about
encouraging Iraqi Shiites -- who make up about half that
country’s 13 million population -- to rise against their Sunni
Moslem leaders.”
[7]
But that’s not all Khomeini did. Milton Viorst gives a more
complete account:
“In January 1979, the ayatollah Khomeini had returned in triumph
to Iran after fifteen years in exile. Iraq promptly recognized
the new regime and extended friendly overtures, but Khomeini was
not impressed. He blamed Saddam personally for his expulsion
from An Najaf [in Iraq, where he had been living in exile] and
left no doubt that he regarded Saddam’s state not just as
anti-Shiite but as anti-Islamic, heretical and illegitimate. …As
early as the summer of 1979, Khomeini repudiated the 1975 treaty
between the shah and Iraq in which the two states pledged
noninterference in each other’s internal affairs. He proceeded
to supply arms to Kurdish guerrillas fighting Baathi rule in the
north, and in An Najaf he financed the Shiite leader Ayatollah
Baqir al-Sadr, who provoked disorders to the end of replacing
the Baathis with a fundamentalist theocracy.”
[8]
Now, under the
official hypothesis that he was the enemy of the US ruling
elite, Khomeini’s immediate provocation of a war with Iraq is
difficult to explain. You see, the previous autocratic and
repressive dictator
of Iran, the Shah (King) Reza Pahlavi, had been a total US
puppet (installed in power in a 1953 CIA coup,
about which more
in a forthcoming piece), and in consequence most of the military
equipment of the Iranian armed forces was American-made. As a
result of the fact that the Iranian revolution had involved some
fighting, “Iran at that time was in dire need of arms and spare
parts for its American-made arsenal.”
[9]
And yet Khomeini went out of his way to engage in dramatic
anti-American provocations at the same time that he picked a
fight with Iraq. For example, Khomeini seized the US embassy in
Iran and took its personnel hostage.
An absurdity?
On the face of it, certainly. If Khomeini needed US spare parts for its military, then
how could he afford to attack Iraq and the US simultaneously?
But the absurdity
can be resolved if you posit that in reality the US ruling elite
and Khomeini were never enemies. In this view, like his
predecessor the shah, Khomeini was a US asset,
and his
‘provocations’ were part of a US-driven political theater for
the unsuspecting global audience, there to generate certain
appearances that the US ruling elite found useful for its
geopolitical game.[9a] What this view requires is that Khomeini
would get his money and spare parts from the US quite despite
his apparent provocations.
And he did.
The Washington
Post claimed in 1980 that “the seizure of the American hostages
has deprived Iran’s military of much-needed U.S. and European
spare parts for its almost entirely imported military
equipment.”
[10]
But this was false. The ‘hostage crisis’ did not deprive
Khomeini of anything. On the contrary. The United States
government offered to pay billions of dollars in exchange for
the release of the hostages, which Iran accepted (the final sum
was close to $8 billion).[11]
And throughout the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, Iran received
secret shipments of US weapons, which became a great
embarrassment to the Reagan administration when this became
known in 1986 (this was called, alternately, ‘Iran-gate’ and the
‘Iran-Contra scandal’). US officials claimed when caught that
the arms shipments had the purpose of getting Iran to lean on
the Hezbollah terrorists it has always patronized in Lebanon,
who at the time had taken some other Americans hostage.
The media was quick to make this explanation seem credible. For
example, the Washington Post told its readers late in 1986 that,
“according to informed sources” (in other words, according to
alleged sources that nobody could check), “an Iranian
government emissary told U.S. representatives he would arrange
for the release of an American hostage held in Lebanon if the
United States would sell Iran 500 TOW antitank missiles.
”[11a]
But this explanation was absurd. History’s greatest power does not
arm to the teeth a fifth-rate power so it can grovel for its
influence on a tiny terrorist organization in third
country, and maybe get some hostages released.
In any case,
it couldn’t be true even in principle. Limited
congressional investigations into the relationship between
Reagan and Khomeini brought to light in 1991, as the New York Times
reported later, that:
“Soon after taking office in 1981, the Reagan Administration
secretly and abruptly changed United States policy and allowed
Israel to sell several billion dollars’ worth of American-made
arms, spare parts and ammunition to the Iranian Government. . .
. . .The change in policy came before the Iranian-sponsored
seizure of American hostages in Lebanon began in 1982. . .”
[my emphasis] [12]
So the
US had the Israelis sell “several billion dollars’ worth” in
arms secretly to the nearby Iranians; meanwhile, explains the NYT,
“The Reagan Administration continued to replenish Israel’s
stockpile of American-made weapons.” But the key point is this:
if the US policy
to send US armament to Iran began before the hostages
were taken in Lebanon, then arming Iran had nothing to do with
buying the freedom of these hostages. The NYT pretends that,
since it didn't, “No
American rationale for permitting covert arms sales to Iran
could be established.” But this is false. Such a rationale
could be
established, it’s just that the New York Times is not allowed to
say it: the US had a policy to sponsor the growth of Islamist
terrorism, which is precisely why the US program through Israel “was
overtaken by the [direct US] arms shipments to Iran,” as the same NYT article states.
The NYT says that,
in deciding to arm the Iranian Islamists, “the [incoming] Reagan Administration secretly and abruptly
changed United States policy.” Is that so? I would argue that
there was no abrupt change whatsoever. Consider what happened in
the case of the hostages that were taken in the American embassy
in Tehran, a crisis that began in the Carter presidency: “Carter, as President,”
as the same article explains, “offer[ed] to accept an Iranian
request and release embargoed Iranian military goods worth about
$150 million -- if the hostages were freed.” Compare that to the
$5.5. billion that Reagan offered and delivered to the Iranians
in exchange for the same embassy hostages. And as I show
in the previous piece in this series,
it is hard to make sense of what happened in the embassy
‘hostage crisis’ unless we assume that Jimmy Carter was running
that show in order to raise the prestige of both the Iranian
Islamists and the PLO.[13]
Reagan’s policies -- including his policies towards the PLO --
were Carter’s.[14]
There was no abrupt change.
Now, since the
arms shipments to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war at first went through Israel, and given that Iran's
new Islamist government
was loudly calling for the destruction of Israel, one may ask:
What was the Israeli government thinking? The New York Times
argues that Israel wanted Iraq and Iran mutually weakened, and
tries to make it seem as if Israel had an independent foreign
policy on this question. And yet the NYT also states all of the
following about the supposedly ‘Israeli’ program:
1) that “Chartered aircraft from Argentina, Ireland and the
United States were used to fly American-made arms to Israel
and, in some cases, directly to Teheran”;
2) that these “chartered flights carrying American arms for Iran
originated from a covert air base near Tucson, Ariz., known as
Marana Air Park”;
3) that “For years, the Central Intelligence Agency has used
Marana for secret arms shipments”;
4) that there was a continuous “flow of spare parts and other
equipment for Iran’s F-14 fleet” and that these “sensitive
items, whose exports are closely monitored by American
officials, were transferred from United States stockpiles to
Israel, which has no F-14’s”; and finally
5) that “Former Israeli officials said the 1981 agreement with
[Secretary of State Alexander M.] Haig was coordinated by Robert
C. McFarlane, who was then the State Department counselor.”
[NOTE: By 1994, three years after the NYT article, Milton Viorst
was writing like this: “Subsequently, it was revealed
that...Alexander Haig, first authorized...arms to Iran in 1981.”[15]]
I think the most
reasonable interpretation is that the US was deciding Israel’s
foreign policy to Israel’s detriment, as it often has. This is
certainly suggested by the fact that, as the NYT also states, it was “Israeli Defense
Minister Ariel Sharon [who] was selling [the] American-made
military materiel” to the Iranians who were calling for
the destruction of Israel. Ariel Sharon is the man now selling Israel
out by allowing unrepentant antisemitic terrorists to take
complete control over Gaza and the Gaza-Egypt border, according
to the wishes of the United States foreign policy elite.
When did the
secret arms shipments to Iran cease? Who knows if they ever did.
But Milton Viorst states that “Subsequently, it was revealed
that...the [arms] shipments went on without significant
interruption until the end of the Iraq-Iran war.”[16]
Depending on whether this means the cease-fire in 1988, or else
the official ending of the war in 1990, the US shipped arms to
the Iranians for at least two or four years after the Iran-gate
scandal first began making headlines in late 1986! The public
scandal, president Reagan’s public apology, the investigations,
etc., were all supposed to have put an end to the arms sales.
But according to Viorst they continued.
How can anybody
argue that these arms sales had anything to do with freeing
hostages in Lebanon?
The bulk of the
evidence suggests, on the contrary, that the US ruling elite
perceived a geopolitical benefit to itself in strengthening the
Iranian Islamists, and that Khomeini was always a US asset. From
this point of view the US pulled off a masterstroke, because,
although the Soviets were obviously not happy with Khomeini’s
Islamism, they preferred anything to a US puppet on their
border. Thus, by replacing the shah with Khomeini, who gave a
convincing theatrical performance as a savage enemy of the
United States, the US switched to a policy of destabilizing its
Soviet rival with Islamist terrorism while appearing to fight
the very ideology it was sponsoring. Brilliant.
So what happened
immediately before the Iran-Iraq war, and what happened
during the Iran-Iraq war, is consistent with Jared
Israel's hypothesis that the US ruling elite sponsors the
Iranian Islamists. What happened after the Iran-Iraq war,
and leading up to the 1991 Gulf War, which is our ultimate goal,
is also consistent, as I now show.
The mastermind: Zalmay Khalilzad
______________________________
To follow the
career of Zalmay Khalilzad is to see the US policy at work,
because he has been one of its main architects. Consider the
following chronology of events:
1988
Iran, badly
beaten by the Iran-Iraq war, and considerably worse off than
Iraq, agrees to a cease-fire. Zalmay Khalilzad, at the time “an
official in the [US State Department’s] office of Policy
Planning” writes a briefing paper for incoming president Bush
Sr., in which he calls for “strengthening Iran and containing
Iraq.”[17]
1989
Zalmay Khalilzad,
in a Los Angeles Times article entitled “Iran Future As A
Pawn Or A Gulf Power,” frets out loud that,
“The Iraqis devastated the Iranians toward the end of the war,
capturing as much as half of the Iranian tanks, armor and
artillery. Iraqi successes forced Iran to accept a cease-fire
that Khomeini compared to drinking a ‘poisoned chalice.’ Iraq is
now militarily dominant, with 45 battle-tested divisions against
Iran’s 12, with even larger ratios of strength in tanks and
aircraft. Tehran is looking for ways to overcome strategic
inferiority and gain a degree of protection against Iraq.
…A further weakened Iran would not increase stability but would
increase Iraqi preeminence in the Gulf and make Iran more
vulnerable to Soviet influence.”
[18]
Clearly,
Khalilzad preferred that Iran become a Gulf power, not a pawn.
And he obviously didn’t like Iraq being strong relative to Iran.
1990
“Zalmay Khalilzad
[becomes] assistant under secretary of defense for policy
planning...” a post that he will hold until 1992.
[19]
This captures 1991, the year that the US launched the Gulf War
against Iraq.
1991 - The Gulf War
The US destroys
Iraq’s military and civilian infrastructure, thereafter imposing
such harsh sanctions that 500,000 children die (more than died
in Hiroshima).
[20]
This was completely out of proportion to Iraq’s offense
(attacking the despotic Kuwaiti monarchy), even if one accepts
the official story of how that happened. But what did this all
amount to, geopolitically? The US was “strengthening Iran and
containing Iraq,” precisely as Khalilzad had advised.
1992
In a Washington
Post editorial entitled "Arm the Bosnians," Zalmay Khalilzad argues (from his new perch at Rand Corp.) that the Bosnian
Muslims should be armed, and that the Afghan strategy -- relying
on Islamic states to arm and train terrorist 'holy warriors' -- should be followed.
[21]
The US did precisely this. As an investigation by the government
of the Netherlands established, Pentagon military intelligence
coordinated with Iran the importation of thousands of
foreign mujahideen ('holy warrior') mercenaries into Bosnia.[22]
These soldiers fought for the Bosnian Islamist and terrorist
Alija Izetbegovic, whose policy was genocide.
[22a]
2003
Iran cooperated closely with
the US invasion of Iraq
(while directing the usual public invective at the US to
distract the issue); and the US took military action, while
invading Iraq, to strengthen the Iranian regime.[23]
The man in charge of US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is,
guess who? That’s right: Zalmay Khalilzad.[24]
2005
Zalmay Khalilzad, now US
ambassador to Iraq, calls for “a withdrawal of American forces
next year”
[25]
even as he observes that Iran is “advancing its long-term goal
of establishing [regional] domination.”[26]
Do you see above anything inconsistent with a pro-Iranian
policy? Me neither.
I point out that
“Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s national-security
adviser...was Khalilzad’s mentor when they were both on the
faculty at Columbia [University].”
[27]
Zbigniew Brzezinski, as we saw earlier, is who invented the US’s
policy of supporting Islamist terrorism in Afghanistan in 1979,
and also the policy of arming Saudi Arabia to the teeth. So the
argument that the US does
not have a general policy to sponsor Islamist terrorism in Asia
is becoming...awkward.
Moreover, it is worth pointing out that if sponsoring Islamist
terrorism in Asia has indeed been the US’s policy, then Iraq has been an
obstacle to it, because it has been a secular state, and an
influential regional power. So perhaps the
Gulf War -- like Bush Jr.’s current war against Iraq -- can be
explained as the US removing a thorn on the side of its
pro-Islamist strategy.
I turn to this
next.
Iraq was an obstacle to the US's pro-Islamist policy;
hence, the Gulf War.
__________________
Let’s go back
again to the year 1988. I remind you that, after 8 long years of
devastating war between Iran and Iraq, this is what happened:
“in August 1988 Iran’s deteriorating economy and recent Iraqi
gains on the battlefield compelled Iran to accept a United
Nations-mediated cease-fire that it had previously resisted.”
[28]
That same year,
General Norman Schwarzkopf, who was to wage the Gulf War just
three years later in 1991, was appointed to head the United
States Central Command, or Centcom. What is Centcom?
“Centcom’s commander…is the overseer of all United States
military activities in 19 countries of the Middle East, Africa
and the Persian Gulf.”
[29]
Milton Viorst
writes that, upon assuming command,
“Schwarzkopf transformed the Central Command, which had been
established in 1983 to counter a Soviet threat, to confront the
Iraqis, who he believed had become the real enemy in the
region.”
[30]
Does it strike
you as strange that the US should have transformed Centcom in
1988 to target Iraq? After all, Centcom is a very big
deal, as you can see above, and the Soviet Union still existed.
Moreover, Centcom “had been established...to counter a Soviet
threat.” Ah, yes, but a Soviet threat to whom? To answer
this question is to dispel the mystery of why Iraq became
Centcom’s new target.
As the New York
Times explained, also in 1988,
“The origins of the Central Command go back to 1979 when the
Shah of Iran was overthrown and his country was in turmoil as a
result of the Islamic revolution…
To provide a military capability to back up President [Carter's]
policy in the Gulf, [in 1980] a command designated the Rapid
Deployment Joint Task Force, which was to be a precursor of
Centcom, was formed.
Paul X. Kelley…[its] first commander…was told to draw up plans
to defend Iran against a Soviet invasion…”
[31]
It is perfectly
clear from the above that the US created Centcom explicitly to
defend Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamist Iran, immediately
after Khomeini came to power, in 1979. Isn’t this consistent
with the view that the Ayatollah Khomeini was always a US asset?
And what else is consistent with this view? Why, that Iraq
should have become Centcom’s new target in 1988, because
in that year Iran lost the war with Iraq and was left vulnerable
to its neighbor, as we saw.
What was at stake
in the Iran-Iraq war? I remind you:
“At stake [in the Iran-Iraq war] was whether the secular [but
still ruthless] Baathism of Saddam or the radical [Islamist]
Shiism of Khomeini would prevail in Iraq, and perhaps in the
Middle East.”
[32]
If that’s what’s
at stake, then support for Iran, since 1979, meant support for
Islamism as the main force that would prevail in the Middle
East. When the US re-oriented Centcom to protect Iran from Iraq,
therefore, it was protecting the growth of Islamism. And when the US destroyed Iraq in the Gulf War, it
was doing the same.
Some have claimed (including the general
himself) that Norman Schwarzkopf came up with the idea of
reorienting Centcom against Iraq, but he was just following
orders.
[33]
Schwarzkopf was responsible, however, for implementing
this policy, and he also directed the Gulf War against Iraq. He
obviously has many uses, because it was also Norman Shwarzkopf who did the preparatory
diplomacy for this war.
I turn to this
next.
The US ordered Kuwait to provoke Iraq
__________________________________
According to the
London Times,
“When Schwarzkopf moved to Central Command [Centcom] in 1988, he
quickly immersed himself in Arab culture and customs. He wore
Arab dress to a dinner with Kuwaiti officers. He embarked on a
round of diplomacy in Arab capitals.”
[34]
Diplomacy for
what?
As it turns out,
to convince the countries of the Gulf that they should now view
Iraq as their enemy. This took some work, because these Gulf
states had just financed Iraq’s war effort against Iran
precisely because, to them, it was the Iranian Shia
fundamentalists who posed the real threat, not the Iraqis.
Kuwait, especially, was worried about the Iranians because it
has a large Shiite minority.
[35]
The Houston
Chronicle explained:
“[Schwarzkopf] believed that Iraq's victory over Iran had
altered the balance of power in the Persian Gulf… [But] King
Hussein of Jordan counseled Schwarzkopf: ‘Don't worry about the
Iraqis. They are war-weary and have no aggressive intentions
against their Arab brothers.’ Even King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and
Sultan Qaboos Bin Said of Oman, who disdained Saddam as a thug,
were not alarmed by him.”
[36]
But according to
Milton Viorst, Schwarzkopf was relentless:
“Schwarzkopf was here on visits before the war, maybe a few
times a year,” an American diplomat in Kuwait told me after the
liberation. “He was a political general, which was in itself
unusual. He kept a personally high profile, and was on a
first-name basis with all the key ministers. He had good
political instincts, and though there were no agreements or
commitments, when the invasion occurred he already had the ties
that he thought he needed. The Kuwaitis feared that when they
called, we wouldn’t come. Schwarzkopf insisted -- explicitly or
not -- that we would…”
Schwarzkopf acknowledges that he toured the Gulf giving out
warnings on Iraq… [He] does not challenge the legitimacy of
Saddam’s concerns over money and the islands, but defines his
own mission as one of persuading the Gulf Arabs that Iraq had
superseded Iran as their chief threat.
[37]
How interesting…
Schwarzkopf himself recognizes that Iraq had legitimate concerns
“over money and the islands.” We shall get to those.
But notice that
the general “defines his own mission as one of persuading the
Gulf Arabs that Iraq had superseded Iran as their chief threat.”
His mission was therefore not to warn the Gulf Arabs of a
real danger, but to persuade them to believe in a
particular, supposed danger. If the danger had been real, there
would have been absolutely no need for Schwarzkopf to convince
anybody in the Gulf, because Gulf states would have been much
more aware of this danger than Schwarzkopf. What Schwarzkopf’s
repeated cajoling and arm-twisting in the Gulf suggests,
therefore, is that he was making clear to the client states of
the US in the Gulf how seriously the United States wanted
them to assume this position: that Iraq was now The Enemy.
What followed is
consistent with this analysis. After Norman Schwarzkopf went
around the Gulf whispering that Iraq was a big threat, Kuwait, the state that got the most ‘warnings’ from
Schwarzkopf about how dangerous Iraq supposedly was, went quite
-- quite -- out of its way to pick a fight with Iraq. But Kuwait was small and utterly defenseless
relative to Iraq (as the Iraqi attack proved). Hadn't
Schwarzkopf just told the Kuwaitis to be careful because Iraq
was now the Big Threat?
Put yourself back
in high school, and imagine that you sit right behind the class
wimp. Someone comes over to him and whispers in his ear that the
class bully hates his guts and is out to get him. Other things
are said but you don’t manage to hear it all. What do you
predict? That the wimp will run and hide, perhaps. That would be
a reasonable prediction. If the class wimp instead gets up and
calls the bully names, spitting in his face for good measure,
you would likely be shocked. But suppose there was some evidence
to suggest that the wimp’s disrespect was deliberately timed so
that the minute the class bully gets going with him the teacher
walks in on them, and the bully is thrown out of school. What
would your hypothesis be now? You didn’t hear everything that
was whispered in the prelude to the fight, but you would be foolish not to suspect that what
you saw was a piece of theater to ‘get’ the class bully,
especially if the class wimp was unable to wipe a devilish grin
from his face. The wimp was bait. You might infer all
this even if you had missed the whispering part, but if you saw
the whispers before the action took place the case would be all
but closed.
I will now give
you a close up of Norman Schwarzkopf’s whispers to the Kuwaitis,
and of the puzzlement they caused in the region. Then I will
show you the Kuwaitis having trouble wiping off a devilish
grin.
The following
excerpt, from Milton Viorst, summarizes what happened, and also
makes an interesting reference to those Iraqi concerns “over
money and the islands” that even Schwarzkopf, the man who bombed
and overran Iraq, recognized were legitimate:
[Excerpt from Milton Viorst begins here]
“Jordan’s Crown Prince Hassan first brought...to my
attention...[that]… the evidence suggested collusion --
deliberate or inadvertent -- between the United States and
Kuwait during the previous spring and summer [leading up to the
Gulf War]...
The Prince noted that the entire Arab world had been bewildered
by Kuwait’s defiant behavior toward Iraq over the course of
their disputes in early 1990. The squabbling began with Kuwait’s
overproduction of oil, which coincided with a fall in the world
price far below the target set by OPEC (Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries). Oil economists pointed out that,
as a country of a half-million citizens, with foreign
investments that generated a huge income, Kuwait could afford a
major price drop... Iraq, a country of seventeen million, was,
by contrast, deeply in debt from eight years of war and
desperately short of cash for reconstruction. Though Kuwait’s
policy might make economic sense, the prince said, governments
do not normally make decisions without considering their
political consequences, and certainly no responsible regime
could fail to take into account the disparity in military power
that existed between Iraq and Kuwait.
What was the explanation...? Kuwait’s oil policy severely
weakened Iraq.
...The Iraqis were transforming Um-Qasr, a fishing village on
its narrow Gulf coastline, into a major naval facility. ...Um-Qasr
needed only Bubiyan and Warba, uninhabited Kuwaiti islands at
the mouth of the port, for its security. The Iraqis asked Kuwait
either to cede the islands or to lease them, but Kuwait refused
any agreement at all. Meanwhile, with Soviet power slipping
rapidly, Washington could, for the first time since Britain’s
departure, contemplate keeping a permanent fleet in the Gulf.
Many Arabs wondered whether Kuwait’s hard line on the islands
was meant to assure American naval supremacy in the Gulf.
During the negotiations in early 1990, in fact, Kuwait offered
concessions on nothing, including division of the Rumaila oil
fields on its boundary with Iraq, a dispute dating back to
colonial times. What is more, Kuwait raised the ante by
demanding repayment with interest of loans it had made to Iraq
during the war, loans which Iraq had assumed would be forgiven
[because Iraq had been fighting a war with Shia Islamist Iran
and one of the main beneficiaries of the Iraqi victory was
the Kuwaiti ruling class, which was very worried about its own large Shia minority, as discussed above].
Iraq’s answer was to demand compensation for some $2.5 billion
in oil that it accused Kuwait of stealing by slant drilling into
its Rumaila wells. To make matters worse, the Kuwaitis were said
to have twice offended Iraq by sending home emissaries who had
come for prearranged meetings with the emir. Even disregarding
the snub, most Arabs agreed that Kuwait was being imprudent.
‘We couldn’t put together the pieces of the mosaic,’ said an
advisor to Prince Hassan, ‘but we were suspicious. The Kuwaitis
were very cocky. They told us officially that the United States
would intervene. We don’t know where they got that impression,
from the United States itself or from another party, like the
British or the Saudis. But they said they knew what they were
doing. They seemed to think they were safe.’”
[38]
[Excerpt from Milton Viorst ends here]
Now, if “[General
Norman] Schwarzkopf was [in Kuwait] on visits before the war,
maybe a few times a year,” as an American diplomat told Milton
Viorst, then it is naturally from Schwarzkopf that the
Kuwaitis got the impression that America would protect them.
Naturally,
Kuwaiti officials will not say in public, “Yes, we are an
American puppet, and we were told to provoke Iraq with a promise
of American military support, so we did as we were told.” But
precisely because they can’t, it is interesting that what they
have said in public comes as close as possible to being
such an admission without actually saying it outright.
Sheikh Ali al
Khalifa, former Kuwaiti minister of oil, at first “denied that
Kuwait, in negotiating with Iraq, was influenced by the prospect
of American military support…” He gave Milton Viorst the Kuwaiti
party line, accusing Saddam Hussein of everything under the sun.
But then he concluded with this stunning admission, which Viorst
himself puts in italics:
“But the American policy was clear... We understood it but
Saddam didn’t. We knew the United States would not let us be
overrun.”
[39]
Sheikh Salem, the
Kuwaiti foreign minister, explained to Viorst that, although the
US did not put it down explicitly on paper, the understanding
between the US and Kuwait was perfectly clear, and Viorst
himself puts his words in italics:
“By the time the crisis began in early 1990, we knew we could
rely on the Americans. There was an exchange of talks on the
ambassadorial level just before the invasion. No explicit
commitments were ever made, but it was like a marriage.
Sometimes you don’t say to your wife ‘I love you,’ but you know
the relationship will lead to certain things.”
[40]
The US could not
quite put it down on paper that it would defend Kuwait because
that might deter the Iraqis from attacking. So Schwarzkopf
informally schmoozed the Kuwaitis for a couple of years and made
sure that they believed the US’s assurances.
Now, under which
hypothesis is it necessary for the US ruling elite to get
Kuwait to provoke a war with Iraq? Under the hypothesis where
the US means to defend Iranian Islamism but must appear to be
fighting for some other reason. By getting Kuwait to provoke
Iraq, the US could claim in public that it was just defending an
innocent country, while critics of US foreign policy complained
bitterly that the US was just defending its Kuwaiti oil. The
entire debate was effectively a diversion, because ‘protecting
Iran as part of a pro-Islamist policy’ was not even one of the
hypotheses that anybody in the media put on the table to explain the Gulf
War.
Under the
hypothesis that the US meant to protect its access to Gulf oil,
by contrast, it is not necessary to get Kuwait to provoke Iraq.
On the contrary, it is absurd. I turn to this next.
The hypothesis that the US attacked Iraq 'for oil' is absurd
__________________________________________________
I understand that
many people think the US does everything 'for oil.' It is a
popular view partly because of the numbing repetition of it, and
repetition has an effect. But a scientist should care only
whether there is any evidence to support it, and whether it
makes logical sense.
According to the
New York Times, when Jimmy Carter established Centcom in 1979 he
did so because he was “Fearful that the Soviet Union would take
advantage of Iranian instability and try to gain control of the
Persian Gulf oilfields.”
[41]
Now, an ability to protect oil may be a plausible
side-benefit of Centcom, but it really is hard to argue that
this was its main purpose.
We have seen
above that US policy has gone quite out of its way to sponsor
Islamist movements even when there is no oil involved, and
Brzezinski himself explained that the promotion of Afghan
Islamism was meant to bring down the Soviet Union. At the very
same time that Brzezinski inaugurated the Islamist policy, Centcom
was created explicitly to protect the new Islamist Republic: Iran,
also on the Soviet border. This is consistent with a general
pro-Islamist policy. By contrast, even assuming that the
original goal of Centcom really was to protect US oil
interests in the Gulf from the Soviets, nothing at all suggests that
Iraq had replaced the Soviet Union as a threat to these
interests when Centcom was reoriented in 1988 to counter Iraq.
Consider:
1) As a potential threat to the US’s oil interests, in 1988 Iraq
was diminutive relative to the Soviet Union -- a virtual
nonentity.
2) By 1988 Iraq was brutally weakened and tired by 8 years of
war with Iran, even it if was a little better off than Iran.
3) It had plenty of its own oil, so the economic motivation to
attack neighboring countries for oil was weak.
4) The geostrategic motivation was even weaker, because Saddam
Hussein knew perfectly well that anybody who attacked US puppets
in the Gulf would invite America's wrath (the US had already
made this perfectly clear during the Iran-Iraq war by putting
the American flag on Kuwaiti tankers).
[42]
5) As we saw, getting Iraq to attack Kuwait required so much
effort by the United States that this point alone makes it quite
obvious that Iraq was not a threat to US oil interests in the
Gulf.
If the US wanted
to protect its access to Gulf oil, all it had to do was warn the
Iraqis very loudly that any messing with the US's client states
in the Gulf would be punished. Then, if Iraq did anything, the
US could punish Iraq. But what the US did instead was provoke a
war with Iraq, when Iraq was obviously not a threat.
This is
precisely what just happened, too, with Bush Jr.'s war on Iraq.
The most
reasonable conclusion for the 1991 Gulf War is that the US attacked Iraq in
order to protect Iranian Islamism. It was "strengthening Iran
and containing Iraq," precisely as Zalmay Khalilzad had
recommended. The bulk of the evidence suggests this is also what
Bush Jr.'s war is all about.